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Abstract—Software applications run on top of infrastructure
consisting of hardware (processors, devices, communication net-
works, . . . ) and software (operating systems, compilers, virtual
machines, language runtimes, databases, . . . ). In many cases,
attacks against application software rely at least to some extent
on aspects of that infrastructure, and in some cases vulnerabilities
can be fixed by strengthening the infrastructure, as well as by
patching the application code.
This paper argues that it is beneficial for secure software
development if the security guarantees offered by the execution
infrastructure are explicit and precisely defined. More specifi-
cally, a developer writing source code that will be executed on
the infrastructure should know what guarantees the infrastruc-
ture offers against what class of attackers. We survey existing
proposals for precise statements of such security guarantees, and
argue that the notion of full abstraction proposed by Martı´n
Abadi as a correctness condition for secure implementation of
abstractions is the key notion for specifying security guarantees
of execution infrastructure.
We give a brief overview of how full abstraction has already
been used to specify and prove security for important building
blocks of an execution infrastructure, and we sketch a research
agenda identifying several interesting open research problems
that, when solved, could contribute to a more secure design
of execution infrastructure for distributed software applications,
and to a better understanding of the security properties of these
infrastructures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the Heartbleed vulnerability, a buffer over-read
vulnerability in the OpenSSL library that could be exploited
to stealthily steal the private key of a web server. Who is
to blame for such a vulnerability? Clearly the developers of
the OpenSSL library carry some of the blame, as the buffer
over-read is definitely a bug in their code. But also the C
compiler (or language) could be blamed for not limiting the
potential consequences of such a bug. A safe language like
Java or Rust [1], or a safe compiler for C [2], would ensure
fail-safe behavior where reading out of bounds leads to a run-
time error rather than to an undetected leak of secrets. And
finally also the operating system / hardware could be blamed
for not providing more fine-grained memory access control.
A capability-enabled processor and operating system [3] for
instance could make sure that a pointer to a buffer used for
storing network data cannot be used to access a memory
segment containing cryptographic keys.
This is just one example of a common phenomenon where
attacks against application software rely at least to some extent
on aspects of the execution infrastructure. There are many
other examples, including for example, all low-level attacks
that exploit memory safety vulnerabilities [4], [5], [6], attacks
that exploit unprotected network communication (e.g. man-in-
the-middle, SSL stripping, tampering with JavaScript loaded
over HTTP) and memory scanning attacks that extract secrets,
such as credit card numbers or cryptographic keys, out of an
application’s address space [7].
We loosely define execution infrastructure to be the col-
lection of hardware and software that contributes to the
execution of a software application represented in source code.
So the execution infrastructure encompasses: compilers, API
implementations, operating systems, protocol stacks, virtual
machine monitors, databases, hardware and so forth.
Attackers can know about, and make use of implementation
details of the execution infrastructure. This can amplify the
security implications of simple application-level bugs such as
the buffer over-read in the Heartbleed example, or introduce
application vulnerabilities that are not apparent from applica-
tion source code, e.g. vulnerabilities to network-level man-in-
the-middle attacks.
The claim behind this paper is that it is essential for secure
development that developers have a clear understanding of the
security guarantees offered by the infrastructure. A necessary
precondition for such understanding is that these guarantees
are explicitly and precisely defined. A design goal should also
be that these security guarantees support secure development
while being efficiently implementable.
Rethinking and better understanding the security guarantees
offered by execution infrastructures is timely, now that more
and more software is developed for the heterogeneous collec-
tion of networked embedded devices known as the Internet
of Things, where there is a much wider variety of hardware
and operating systems than for desktop or server applications.
This heterogeneity makes it more realistic to experiment
with different execution infrastructures that provide different
security guarantees.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in
Section II we elaborate on the problem statement, and dis-
cuss two important existing security notions, identifying full
abstraction [8] as a key notion for defining the security of
an execution infrastructure. In Section III we briefly survey
some existing results on full abstraction, but we also point to
several interesting open problems and research questions with
respect to the security properties of execution infrastructures
for distributed applications. Finally, Section IV concludes the
paper.
II. SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR EXECUTION
INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Problem statement
A developer working on a software application relies in
an essential way on abstraction. The programming language
is a convenient abstraction of (among others) the hardware
processor and memory, and various APIs offer an abstract
view of databases, communication networks, and so forth.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume – without loss of
generality – that all relevant APIs are modeled as source
language primitives. In that case the abstractions that the
developer works with are exactly those of the source language,
and their meaning can be defined by defining an operational
semantics for that source language, for instance in the form
of an abstract machine.
These abstractions can be (and often are) relevant for the
security of the application being developed. Sometimes this is
very explicit, for example when the application uses a secure
channel abstraction. But often there are also subtle and implicit
dependencies. For instance, abstracting physical memory as a
heap of objects is a common abstraction in source languages
and security may depend on adequate isolation between two
heap objects.
The infrastructure for executing the software implements
the source language (including all these abstractions) using
techniques such as compilation, interpretation, multiplexing,
virtualization, resource-sharing, and so forth.
At run-time, attackers wishing to abuse the software can
often interact with the resulting run-time system at multiple
layers of abstraction: they may share resources (such as CPU
and memory) with the application under attack because they
can execute code on the infrastructure too, and they may
even have complete control over some of these resources (for
instance the network, or removable storage devices).
A key question is: what security guarantees does (or should)
the infrastructure offer with respect to the source language
abstractions used by the developer?
Obviously, the answer to this question depends on the at-
tacker model too. Can the attacker observe or modify network
traffic? Can the attacker send input to, or receive output
from the application? Can the attacker load code in the same
process that the application is running in? We are interested in
understanding and improving the security guarantees offered
by the execution infrastructure under realistic attacker models.
There are at least two important such guarantees that have
been proposed and studied extensively: language safety and
full abstraction.
B. Language safety
The notion of language safety [9] considers the operational
semantics of the source code and provides the guarantee that
this semantics will never run into undefined behavior. Through
a combination of type checks, bounds checks, general precon-
dition checks if APIs are modeled as part of the language,
and memory management, the compiler and run-time system
together ensure that the execution of any source program
is always well-defined. Of course, sometimes, in order to
maintain safety, execution will be defined to terminate with
an error-condition, for instance when a bounds-check or a
precondition check fails.
Language safety is a very useful property. In our initial
example, the use of a safe programming language would
ensure that upon triggering the Heartbleed vulnerability, the
web server terminates with an error instead of leaking the
contents of the memory words adjacent to the over-read buffer.
But the attacker model considered by language safety is
rather weak. Attackers can only interact with the program in
ways defined by the source code semantics, e.g. by providing
input to the program or by reading output from the program.
This attacker model is appropriate in some scenarios, for
instance for a server program running on a physically isolated
and well maintained machine that is not concurrently executing
software from other stakeholders. Yet, for most application
scenarios realistic attackers can do more than just providing
input and reading output. In addition, language safety by itself
does not provide any confidentiality guarantees.
Essentially, language safety only deals with the case where
the attacker cannot attack the software system at a lower
layer of abstraction than the source code, and in that case
it guarantees integrity of the run-time state of the application.
C. Full abstraction
1) What is full abstraction?: A compiler from some source
language to a target language is fully abstract if it preserves
abstractions. Hence a first question is: what exactly is an
“abstraction”? Intuitively, an abstraction is a program part
(like a function, object or module) that offers some service or
functionality to other parts of the program (the clients of the
abstraction, or the program contexts in which the program part
is placed). The program part can hide some implementation
details of how it offers that service: the same abstraction
can typically be implemented in many different ways. For
instance, a sorting function is an abstraction that can be
implemented based on a variety of different algorithms. A set
is an abstraction that can be implemented based on different
data structures.
We formally define what an abstraction is in a rather
indirect way, by defining when two program parts are the same
abstraction. We define this as follows: two program parts are
the same abstraction if and only if clients (contexts) can not
distinguish between the two program parts. For instance, two
sorting function implementations implement the same “sorting
function” abstraction, if clients can not distinguish them: in
any client program using one of the implementations, we
can replace that implementation with the other one without
impacting the result of the client program.
Formally, the notion that no program context can distinguish
two program parts is captured in the definition of observational
equivalence (also called contextual equivalence). It is sufficient
to require that all contexts have the same termination be-
haviour on the two program parts: if there would be any other
observational difference, for instance different return values,
we can also create another somewhat bigger program context
that will go into an infinite loop or not depending on that
return value.
We do not further formalize the notions of “program part”
and “program context” as this would depend on the specific
programming language under consideration, but we assume
that given a program part p and a program context C, we
can plug the program part into the context resulting in a full
program C[p]. Then we can define observational equivalence
formally.
Definition 1: Two program parts p1 and p2 are observation-
ally equivalent (denoted as p1 ≈obs p2) if for all contexts C,
C[p1] terminates if and only if C[p2] terminates.
This definition of observational equivalence in turn im-
plicitly defines what an abstraction is: it is an equivalence
class of program parts under the observational equivalence
relation. The abstraction of “a sorting function” is the class
of all observationally equivalent implementations that perform
sorting.
Now a compiler is fully abstract if it preserves abstractions:
if we compile two program parts that are observationally
equivalent (i.e. that are the same abstraction), then the com-
piled program parts should also be observationally equivalent
in the target language (i.e. clients programmed in the target
language can also not observe any difference between the
compiled program parts).
More formally, writing bpc for the compilation of program
part p to the target language, we require that p1 ≈obs p2
implies that bp1c ≈obs bp2c.
In addition, we should require the compiler to be correct,
which usually implies the inverse of the implication above:
if two compiled program parts are observationally equiva-
lent, then the corresponding source program parts must be
equivalent. Since this direction of the implication (reflection
of observational equivalence) is less important for security we
do not emphasize it for the rest of this paper. The definition
of full abstraction requires both directions of the implication.
Definition 2: A compiler bc is fully abstract if it preserves
and reflects observational equivalence:
∀p1, p2 : p1 ≈obs p2 ⇐⇒ bp1c ≈obs bp2c
It is important to note that the equivalence bp1c ≈obs bp2c
is observational equivalence in the target language. And the
target language may have much stronger observational power
than the source language. For instance, if the target language is
machine code, then machine code clients can easily distinguish
between two different implementations of a sorting function,
for instance by reading the memory that contains the compiled
code. Many compilers are not fully abstract exactly for this
reason.
2) Full abstraction for security: Abadi [8] was the first to
propose full abstraction as a security correctness condition. If
an abstraction in the source language hides (or protects the
integrity of) some information towards clients in the source
language, then a fully abstract compiler will hide (or protect)
that information also after compilation against arbitrary clients
in the target language. If we think of clients as attackers,
that are trying to distinguish two program parts to extract
some of the information that an abstraction is hiding, then full
abstraction says that any attack that is possible in the target
language, is also possible in the source language. In other
words, if no attacks are possible within the source language,
then there are also no attacks after compilation, even if the
attacker can interact with the compiled program at the level
of the target language.
Keeping this in mind, the intuition behind using full ab-
straction as a security condition for execution infrastructures
is:
• The developer can develop his application in the source
language, thinking only about attackers that operate at
the level of the source language. He can rely on source
language features (such as private local state for objects,
or secure communication channels) to build his own
application specific abstractions, and it is up to the
developer to make sure that clients of these abstrac-
tions within the source language can not break intended
security properties of these abstractions. An underlying
assumption is that attacks that we care about can indeed
be modeled as a program context or client that succeeds
in distinguishing two implementations of the same ab-
straction. Agten et al. [10] give examples of how attacks
against confidentiality and integrity properties of software
can be modeled this way.
• The execution infrastructure is modeled as (1) a target
language (at a lower abstraction level) and (2) a transla-
tion of source programs to that target language.
The split between what is modeled in the target language
and what is modeled in the translation is determined by
the attacker model. We choose the target language such
that target language contexts are a realistic model of
what an attacker can do to the execution infrastructure.
One can think of the target language as a model of the
execution infrastructure as seen by attackers, whereas the
source language is a model of the execution infrastructure
as seen by developers. Roughly speaking, more powerful
attackers will be modeled by using a less abstract target
language.
• Now, full abstraction provides the following security
guarantee: the execution infrastructure ensures that, if
the developer avoids all source level attacks against
his application specific abstractions, then no attacks are
possible against these abstractions when running on the
execution infrastructure under the chosen attacker model.
In other words no “layer below” attacks [11] are possible
within the chosen attacker model.
Full abstraction is a powerful and versatile correctness
condition for the secure implementation of abstractions. It also
is a security guarantee that is really targeted towards (and
useful for) developers: it supports what Gordon et al. [12]
have called the principle of source-based reasoning, i.e. if
the execution infrastructure is fully abstract with respect to
a realistic attacker model, then it is sound to reason about
security properties of application software running on that
infrastructure based on application source code.
It is worthwhile to emphasize that, while full abstraction is
formally a property of a compiler between two programming
languages, it is useful to think of the source and target
languages not just as programming languages but as models of
the execution infrastructure. The source language models the
execution infrastructure as seen by developers, and hence this
model will be closely related to the source language used by
the developer, but it may also include models of some of the
libraries used by the developer. The target language models
the execution infrastructure as seen by attackers. This may
include a model of machine code in case the attacker can do
code injection attacks, but it will also include models of the
security mechanisms used by the compiler as well as very
specific primitives that model specific attacker capabilities.
III. STATE OF THE ART AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Given the interesting properties of full abstraction, it is
not surprising that this concept has been studied in various
security-related settings:
• Full abstraction was first studied [13] as a correctness
condition for cryptographic protocols, where the source
language is a programming language that offers some
notion of confidential or integrity protected communica-
tion channel, and the target language is a programming
language with symbolic cryptographic primitives and
where communication happens over a public network.
Target language contexts model attackers that have access
to the public network and can handle cryptographic
messages symbolically, hence this essentially models a
Dolev-Yao style attacker [14].
• More recently, it was also studied by several au-
thors (cf. [15], [16], [10], [17], [18]) as a correctness
condition for compilation of programming language ab-
stractions like private local state, objects, closures, and
so forth to machine code for a machine that has some
memory access control primitives.
Different authors have studied compilation to address-
space layout randomization (ASLR, [15], [16]), to pro-
tected module architectures (cf. [10], [17]) and to
metadata-tracking processors [19].
• In the setting of compiler correctness and security, full
abstraction of typical compiler passes like closure conver-
sion [20], type erasure [21], or CPS transformation [22]
have been studied, where the source and target languages
are intermediate languages used by the compiler.
• Some security vulnerabilities of the web platform have
been studied as violations of full abstraction. Baltopoulos
and Gordon [12] describe browser-side tampering with
application data as a violation of full abstraction, and pro-
pose a solution where the compiler of a multi-tier source
language automatically inserts the necessary encryption
and authentication for data stored on the browser.
Fournet et al. [23] show full abstraction of a compiler
from an ML-like language to JavaScript, thus making it
possible to rely on security properties of the ML code
even if that code is executed in a malicious JavaScript
context within the browser.
In summary, we understand the security properties of at
least some of the building blocks of a typical execution
infrastructure.
However, full abstraction is also a challenging property in
the sense that it is sometimes hard or impossible to have
fully abstract and efficient implementations, and that the
quantification over program contexts in the definition of full
abstraction also makes it hard to prove full abstraction in
many cases. In the following we discuss some of the research
challenges that need to be addressed.
A. Full abstraction can be too strict
Full abstraction is a quite strict correctness condition. This
was already noted by Abadi et al. in the first paper that
constructed a fully abstract implementation of secure channel
abstractions [13]. Since it was not possible in their source
language to determine what processes are sending messages
to other processes, a fully abstract translation to a target
language where attackers can observe the public network needs
to build in protections against traffic analysis: target language
contexts (attackers) should not be able to learn more than
source language contexts. Building in protection against traffic
analysis is however expensive in terms of communication cost.
It would definitely be interesting to also understand the precise
security guarantees that the execution infrastructure offers if
it does not protect against traffic analysis.
Similar phenomena can be observed in other scenarios
where full abstraction is used as the correctness criterion.
For example, the secure compiler of Patrignani et al. [17]
needs to mask object references to make sure a target language
context cannot learn anything about the memory layout of a
compiled module, and needs to make all modules of the same
size to avoid leaking information about the size of modules.
These are also examples where achieving full abstraction is
expensive, and where it would be interesting to understand the
security guarantees one can still have without these expensive
countermeasures.
An interesting question is if we can come up with weaker
notions than full abstraction that still give a precise and useful
security guarantee to developers.
One strategy for addressing this question is to play with the
source language: by adding constructs to the source language
that expose information (like who is sending messages to
who, or how “large” is a given source language module)
full abstraction no longer requires the infrastructure to protect
against leaking that information: it now becomes a responsibil-
ity for the application developer to implement this protection
in source code if it is required.
Recall that the general idea is that the developer is respon-
sible for protecting against attacks that can be modeled as
source code contexts, and hence by adding these features to
the source code language we shift more security responsibility
to the developer and less to the infrastructure.
A very extreme variant of this idea exposes the entire
run-time representation of the application state at the source
code level, i.e. the source code language is extended with a
very strong (but read-only) reflection API. In that case, full
abstraction requires the execution infrastructure to only protect
the integrity of the run-time state of the application, and not
its confidentiality, and often this can be implemented much
less expensively.
In ongoing research, we are currently building an execution
infrastructure for distributed event-driven applications that is
fully abstract in this weak sense for a standard event-driven
programming language and for a powerful attacker model.
The prototype implementation uses Sancus hardware [24] for
isolation and attestation of application modules, and symmetric
cryptography for protecting network communication, and the
performance and communication overhead is substantially
lower than the overhead that would be imposed by an exe-
cution infrastructure that is fully abstract in the strong sense.
B. What are the right abstractions at both abstraction layers?
When using full abstraction as a security property of an
execution infrastructure, the source language should model
the execution infrastructure as seen by developers. Hence it
should contain abstractions and primitives that are convenient
and simple to program with, such as local private state, or
secure channels.
The target language on the other hand should model the exe-
cution infrastructure as seen by attackers. Hence it should only
contain abstractions and primitives for which it is reasonable
to assume that attackers cannot break them. Typical examples
include cryptographic primitives and abstractions of security
primitives that are implemented in hardware. While the set of
cryptographic primitives that execution infrastructure builders
can choose from is relatively small and stable, the design space
for hardware protection mechanisms is relatively open.
For a given source language, full abstraction can be easy
or hard to achieve depending on the choice of primitives in
the target language. So a very interesting question is: what
kind of hardware security primitives are good for achieving
fully abstract implementation of interesting source language
features? While we have shown in earlier work, [10] and [17],
that it is possible to compile objects fully abstractly to a
processor that supports Intel SGX-style memory access con-
trol [25], [26], others have recently shown [19] that better
fully abstract compilers can be designed that target hardware
with tagged memory [27]. We conjecture that hardware that
supports capability-style memory protection [3] might even be
a better target.
There is an entire design space to be explored here: for each
of the source language constructs that one is interested in, it
is important to explore the cryptographic and hardware prim-
itives that can implement that construct fully abstractly and
efficiently. Parametric polymorphism might require symmetric
encryption or a hardware primitive for sealing [28]. Closures
and objects might require capability-based memory protection.
Linking with strong names (as in the .NET framework) might
require primitives for attestation.
Two interesting, open-ended and related research questions
about this design space are:
• What are the most versatile hardware primitives for se-
curely and efficiently implementing current programming
languages?
• What are the most useful or convenient source lan-
guages that can be fully abstractly implemented using
the hardware protection mechanisms that are available in
processors today?
Alternatively, for execution infrastructures where it may
be acceptable to have a larger trusted computing base (for
instance the web platform, if one cares mainly about web-level
attacks like cross-site scripting, SQL injection or cross-site
request forgery), the target language should include models
of all parts of the infrastructure that are trusted, including
for instance browsers and databases. Then an interesting
question is: what security mechanisms should browsers or
databases implement to make fully abstract compilation of
web applications feasible and practical? This is currently a
largely unexplored area.
C. Full abstraction can be hard to prove
The definition of observational equivalence of program parts
quantifies over program contexts, and hence the definition of
full abstraction quantifies over both source language and target
language contexts, and this can make full abstraction hard
to prove. Some conjectures about full abstraction have been
open for many years. For example the fact that parametric
polymorphism can be compiled fully abstractly to an untyped
calculus extended with an idealized cryptographic sealing
primitive was conjectured more than a decade ago [29], [28],
and it is still not proven.
But there are several interesting evolutions in the develop-
ment of proof techniques for full abstraction.
An important step was the development of fully abstract
trace semantics for realistic languages, first developed by
Jeffrey and Rathke for the JavaJr language [30]. A fully
abstract trace semantics defines the semantics of a program
part as a set of interaction traces that are possible with that
part, and it has the property that two program parts are
observationally equivalent if and only if they have the same set
of such possible interaction traces. If both source and target
language have a fully abstract trace semantics, proving full
abstraction of a translation from source to target can be done
by constructing a relation between the set of traces of the
source program part and the set of traces of the corresponding
compiled program part.
Another important evolution is that the proof technique of
logical relations has been developed extensively over the past
decade [31]. In [22], [20] and [32], Ahmed and her colleagues
have developed proof techniques based on logical relations for
proving full abstraction of compilation steps such as closure
conversion or CPS translation.
Finally, an interesting novel proof technique was presented
very recently [21]: it suffices to construct approximate (in
a well-defined technical sense) back-translations from target
program parts and contexts to corresponding source program
parts and contexts to prove preservation of observational
equivalence.
With this arsenal of new proof techniques, one can hope that
new and interesting full abstraction proofs are now in reach,
and that existing conjectures can finally be proven.
D. Fully abstract APIs specified with program logics
For some of the abstractions offered by execution infras-
tructures (like objects, types and secure channels), it has been
studied how to implement them fully abstractly with existing
cryptographic and hardware protection primitives.
But in general the execution infrastructure can offer a wide
variety of APIs exposing all kinds of resources (memory,
I/O devices, . . . ) in an abstract way to the developer. Hence,
an interesting question is whether there is a general way to
guarantee the secure implementation of abstractions offered
by such APIs.
A promising approach that can handle a wide variety of
APIs is to consider the specification of the API in a resource-
aware program logic (like separation logic [33], [34]). These
specifications can be seen as the definition of new source
level abstractions. The question then is how the execution
infrastructure can ensure that this kind of abstraction is secure.
At least two promising approaches are being studied. First, the
infrastructure can enforce the API contract at run time, using
some form of contract checking. Agten et al. have shown how
to do this for separation logic [35], but their contract checks
are not yet sufficient to achieve full abstraction. Second,
the security of the implementation of the abstraction can be
verified statically. Jung et al. [36] have recently proposed a
program logic that supports proving the correctness of layered
abstractions over a shared resource like a network or a heap.
E. Refining the attacker model reflected in the target language
Full abstraction is a useful security property if program
contexts in the target language are a realistic model of at-
tackers. Target languages that have been considered by the
existing works on full abstraction are only approximations of
a realistic attacker model – for instance, they do not model
the attacker’s capabilities to do certain kinds of side channel
attacks, or they model cryptographic primitives in an idealized
symbolic manner.
An interesting research question is how to extend these
target languages to include more attacker capabilities, while
maintaining the feasibility of a fully abstract translation to
that target language. Can we model timing side channels
adequately by equipping the target language with primitives
for measuring time? Can we model attackers that can reboot
a system, and show that state-continuity techniques (cf. [37],
[38], [39]) can be incorporated in the translation to achieve
full abstraction? Can we consider target languages with com-
putational (as opposed to symbolic) models of cryptography?
A harsh reality in security is that once a system is provably
secure against some attacker model, often real attackers will
start coming up with new attacks that fall outside of that
attacker model. So one can expect multiple iterations to further
refine the target language, and the end goal is not to come up
with a final target level model (i.e. a final attacker model), but
instead, the goal is to gain understanding of how the cost of
protection goes up as more and more powerful attackers are
considered.
This in turn can enable developers to balance the secu-
rity guarantees they require from the execution infrastructure
against the price they are willing to pay for it.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
A rich body of research from the seventies and eighties
on operating systems security explores the design space of
security guarantees that can be offered by multi-user oper-
ating systems, including a variety of access control models
(discretionary versus mandatory access control, groups, roles
and hierarchies, and so forth). We have built up a relatively
deep understanding of how software infrastructure can support
multiple users securely.
But we do not yet have the same level of understand-
ing about how software infrastructure can support secure
development. What are the exact security guarantees that
infrastructure offers to developers and under what attacker
models? We have discussed two important examples of such
security guarantees: language safety which is extremely useful
but considers a relatively weak attacker model and addresses
integrity but not confidentiality; and full abstraction, which
is very versatile and provides strong guarantees, but cannot
easily be implement efficiently for some attacker models, and
is sometimes technically challenging to prove.
This paper argues that substantial additional research efforts
from the entire community are required to systematically
explore the design space of appropriate security guarantees
for execution infrastructures, as well as the design space of
cryptographic and hardware protection mechanisms to realize
these security guarantees.
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